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TORTS-PRIMA FACIE TORT-LIABILITY FOR INSTIGATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION-Plaintiff organized a corporation for the
purpose of collecting funds from the public to aid cancer victims. Defendant, well-known columnist engaged in soliciting money for a rival cancer
fund, was alleged, inter alia, to have instigated state and federal government investigations and prosecutions that resulted in plaintiff being criminally convicted and subsequently acquitted on a new trial after appeal.
As a consequence of these actions, public confidence had been destroyed in
plaintiff's cancer fund corporation and it had ceased to function. Plaintiff complained that defendant's actions were done with the intention of
harming plaintiff and had resulted in plaintiff's loss of salary as director
of the cancer fund corporation, and in plaintiff's loss of his private detective license. On appeal from an appellate division decision ordering the
complaint dismissed, held, affirmed. Although generally a lawful act for
the malicious purpose of harming plaintiff that does harm plaintiff may
be actionable/ in this type of situation the best interests of the public are
advanced by exposure of the truth by official action, and such truth should

l Principal case at 163, citing Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191
N.E. 713 (1934), and Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923).
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not be shack.led by fear of a civil action for damages. Brandt v. Winchell,
3 N.Y. (2d) 628, 148 N.E. (2d) 160 (1958).
The courts, in actions complaining of wrongful instigation or use of
judicial process, are faced with two opposing policy considerations. On
the one hand they recognize an interest in being free from unjustifiable
and vexatious legal proceedings.2 On the other hand the courts realize
the importance of a policy of encouraging citizens to report apparent
crimes3 and to have free access to the courts. Consequently actions of the
type represented by the principal case are generally discouraged4 and
surrounded by limitations more stringent than in other causes of action.5
When bringing suit for damages due to instigation or misuse of judicial
process6 a plaintiff traditionally has had two theories on which to base
his action: malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The tort of malicious
prosecution is an ancient and well established action7 designed to recompense an accused person for injury to his reputation, person, and
finances due to unwarranted legal proceedings.8 Limited in England to
actions for prior criminal prosecutions, in this country the action is
generally extended to cover prior civil proceedings and even administrative proceedings (e.g., revocation of licenses).9 Although there is not complete agreement on the nature of specific elements of this cause of action,
those elements necessary for recovery because of a prior criminal proceeding are generally held10 to be (1) a prosecution instituted by defendant,11
(2) a prior termination of the proceedings in favor of the accused (plaintiff in the instant action),12 (3) a lack of probable cause for the prosecution,13 and (4) "malice" or collateral private purpose other than the public

2Tutton v. Olsen&: Ebann, 251 Mich. 642, 232 N.W. 399 (1930). See 3 TORTS REsrATE·
l\lENT §653, Introduction (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 645 (1955); Melvin v. Pence,
(D.C. Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 423.
3 Melvin v. Pence, note 2 supra, at 428.
4 Carere v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 259 Mass. 238, 156 N.E. 55 (1927).
5 Luther v. First Bank of Troy, 64 Idaho 416, 133 P. (2d) 717 (1943). See also Melvin
v. Pence, note 2 supra, which reasons that a contrary policy would result, in civil cases
at least, in repeated litigation instead of the first suit being an end to the matter.
6 Assuming here that the process is correct and regular, as opposed to the situation
giving rise to an action for false imprisonment. See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 646 (1955).
7 The leading case is Saville v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 87 Eng. Rep. 725 (1698).
s Luther v. First Bank of Troy, note 5 supra. See PROSSER, TORTS, ·2d ed., 645 (1955).
9 Melvin v. Pence, note 2 supra, at 426, 427. See also 3 TORTS REsrATElllENT §675
and §680 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 662 (1955). Where prior civil process is the subject
of the complaint, recovery is generally limited to those cases where special injury can be
shown, Melvin v. Pence, note 2 supra, at 426.
10 See, generally, Luther v. First Bank of Troy, note 5 supra; Tutton v. Olsen &:
Ebann, note 2 supra; Ranke v. State, 206 Misc. 569, 134 N.Y.S. (2d) 83 (1954); 3 TORTS
REsrATEMENT §653 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 646 (1955).
11 See note 10 supra. Concerning the meaning of "instituted" see Melvin v. Pence,
note 2 supra, at 427.
12 Friedman v. Roseth Corp., 190 Misc. 742, 74 N.Y.S. (2d) 733 (1947).
13 Simpson v. Coastwise Lumber &: Supply Co., 239 N.Y. 492, 147 N.E.· 77 (1925).
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purpose of bringing a lawbreaker to trial.14 In the principal case malicious
prosecution would fail even though defendant had malice because there
is no lack of probable cause for his instigation of official action15 and because there has not been a complete termination of the prior process in
plaintiff's favor.10
The gist of the second traditional tort, abuse of process, is generally
said to be the improper use of a regular legal process, civil or criminal,17
for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed.18 Abuse
of process seems to have developed to redress grievances that malicious
prosecution could not reach with its strict limitations19 and neither a
termination of prior proceedings20 nor a lack of probable cause21 need
usually be shown to maintain this action. However, the elements of this
tort are not so well defined as those of malicious prosecution. Exactly
what misuse of process will be grounds for recovery is the subject of controversy.22 The courts frequently say that if the process were used for its
proper purpose (i.e., not for collateral coercion of some kind23 nor to impose discomfort vindictively24), then no amount of malice or improper
motive will be grounds for an abuse of process action.25 In th~ principal

14 Tutton

v. Olsen & Ebann, note 2 supra, at 645.

15 Conviction by a jury, even though later reversed, usually

is held to be conclusive
proof of existence of probable cause. Carere v. F. W. Woolworth Co., note 4 supra. See
also PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 657 (1955).
16 Official action, including a consent injunction against plaintiff engaging in the
charitable subscription business, still stands. The court in the principal case indicated
its reluctance to consider what it called a "collateral attack upon the official acts of
public authorities in a litigation to which the authorities are not parties:• Principal
case at 163.
17 Ash v. Cohn, ll9 N.J.L. 54, 194 A. 174 (1937). See 3 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §682 (1938).
18 Rhoades v. Adelman, 145 N.Y.S. (2d) 766 (1955); Tricomi v. Tricomi, 192 Misc.
763, 81 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1948); Rothbard v. Ringler, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 351 (1947).
19 The leading case is Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. (N .C.) 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838)
wherein a cause of action was allowed plaintiff against a defendant who had used a
debt warrant to coerce plaintiff to give up a ship registry.
20 Grainger v. Hill, note 19 supra. See also 3 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §682, comment a
(1938). Cf. Friedman v. Roseth Corp., note 12 supra.
21 Grainger v. Hill, note 19 supra. See 32 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1948); 3 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §682, comment a (1938).
22 It is said that the process must be used for some purpose other than that which
it is designed for. Lader v. Benkowitz, 188 Misc. 906, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 713 (1946); Serxner
v. Elgart, 196 Misc. 1053, 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 731 (1949). See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 669 (1955);
but other courts have said that there is also an abuse when process is used for its
legitimate purpose in a reckless or oppressive way. Smith v. Weeks, 60 Wis. 94, 18 N.W.
778 (1884), and see dissenting opinion in Deeter v. Riedel, 96 Wis. 158, 71 N.W. II9 (1897).
23 Grainger v. Hill, note 19 supra.
24Ash v. Cohn, note 17 supra, where a body execution to enforce an appeal bond
was used by defendant to hold plaintiff in jail over a weekend although defendant knew
plaintiff had property which could be attached.
25 Meisels v. J.C.A. Trading Corp., 189 Misc. 46, 69 N.Y.S. (2d) 720 (1947): Hauser
v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 7 N.E. (2d) 268 (1937). See King v. Henderson, [1898] A. C. 720;
and 7 BROOK. L. REV. 123 (1937).
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case there is indication that legal process was used to accomplish only the
purpose for which it was designed (i.e., to protect the public by preventing allegedly improper soliciting of funds in this case) and consequently an
abuse of process action would not Jie.
Since in the principal case the plaintiff cannot come within one of
the accepted categories of tort liability, his only hope for recovery was the
prima fade tort theory, that intentional infliction of temporal damages
is a cause of action which requires justification by the defendant if he is
to escape liability.26 This theory changes the older common law idea that
bad motives cannot make a lawful act unlawful,27 and is opposed to the
view that only that action is a tort which falls within one of the particularly
defined classes or categories of tort.28 In England in the late nineteenth
century29 and in this country in the early twentieth century30 the principle
of motives being the essence of unlawfulness was recognized, and in a
leading case before the United States Supreme Court31 Justice Holmes
stated this view as the prima fade tort doctrine. The New York courts are
committed to this unified theory of intentional tort law; 32 consequently
plaintiff in the principal case argued that the otherwise lawful act of
setting official agencies in motion to investigate or prosecute should not
be different from any other act which becomes unlawful when done solely
with bad motives of harming plaintiff.33 But in cases involving instigation and use of legal process and official action it appears that New York
courts, at least, will consider important policy arguments connected with
the specific torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, namely,
the need to encourage exposure of "those guilty of offenses against the
public."34 The New York court applied these policy considerations to
26 Principal case at 162.
27 See Judge Cooley's statement quoted in PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 21 (1955).
28 A view attributed to Sir John Salmond. See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 3 (1955).
29 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B. 598 (1889); Temperton

v. Russell, [1893] I Q.B. 715; Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495. See also Lumley v. Gye,
2 El. & Bl. 216, ll8 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853); and cf. Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1. It is
generally considered, however, that England does not today subscribe to the prima facie
tort doctrine. See Forkosch, "An Analysis of the 'Prima Facie Tort' Cause of Action,"
42 CoRN. L. Q. 465 at 473 (1957}; Hale, "Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Nonfeasance," 46 CoL. L. REv. 196 at 197 (1946).
30 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900); Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass.
485, 59 N.E. 125 (1900); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
31 Aikens v. Wisconsin, note 30 supra. The first use of the term "prima facie" in
connection with the extension of tort concept was probably by Wightman, J., in Lumley
v. Gye, note 29 supra.
32 Principal case at 163; Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E. (2d) 214 (1953);
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E. (2d) 401 (1946);
Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941); Beardsley v. Kilmer,
supra note 1. Other states accepting the prima facie tort view include Massachusetts,
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, and North Carolina. See Forkosch, "An Analysis
of the 'Prima Facie Tort' Cause of Action," 42 CoRN. L. Q. 465 at 479, 480 (1957).
33 Principal case at 163.
34 Principal case at 164.
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deny plaintiff a cause of action in the principal case.35 The prima fade
tort theory generally calls upon the courts to weigh matters of policy more
than traditional tort concepts might. 36 In so doing, the principal case
illustrates how the flexible and still developing theory of prima fade tort
may be limited on its frontiers by many of the same arguments that prevented recovery under the categorical or "pigeon-hole" view of tort liability.

John H. Jackson

35 In Friedman v. Roseth Corp., note 12 supra, the Supreme Court for New York
County refused to extend the prima fade tort theory ~o establish a cause of action for
instituting actions on contract where the contract actions had not terminated, using
basically the same reasoning it used to reject malicious prosecution and abuse of process
counts.
36 Forkosch, "An Analysis of the 'Prima Fade Tort' Cause of Action," 42 CoRN. L. Q.
465 at 467 (1957).

